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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
SANTOS TENA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Nature of the Case 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NO. 40423 
CASSIA COUNTY NO. CR 2011-3106 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Santos Tena asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the Idaho 
Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion No. 29 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2014) (hereinafter, 
Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed the denial of his motion to 
suppress, is in conflict with previous decisions of the Court of Appeals insofar as it holds 
that Mr. Tena's mother had apparent authority to consent to the search of Mr. Tena's 
bedroom. As a result, the Opinion is in contravention of the relevant precedent, and this 
Court should exercise its review authority in this case. 
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Assuming review is granted, Mr. Tena requests that this Court reverse the district 
cou of his motion to suppress and remand his case to the district court for 
further ings. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Thirty~one-year-old Mr. Tena had been paying his parents rent for a bedroom in 
the basement of his parents' house at 491 Hwy. 81 between Burley and Declo. 
(Tr., p.l, L.5 p. 9, L.6, p.11, Ls.4-16; see Tr., p.l, Ls. '13-18, p.28, Ls.B-10.) Cassia 
County Sheriff's Deputies Bernad and Garrett were dispatched to the residence to serve 
two on Mr. Tena. (R., p.23; Tr., p.28, Ls.8-28, p.44, L.1 - p.45, L.4.) 
At the residence, the officers contacted Rebecca Tena, Tena's mother. 
(Tr., p.l, p.45, L.19 - p.46, L.20.) The officers asked whether Mr. T ena was 
the residence, and Ms. Tena pointed down the stairs and stated that he was asleep. 
(Tr., p.46, L.20 - p.41, L.3.) She called down to him, and Mr. Tena then argued with 
her. (Tr., p.41, Ls.4-13.) The officers were not able to tell what they were arguing 
about. (Tr., p.47, Ls.i7-23.) The officers went to the bottom of the stairs and arrested 
Mr. Tena. (Tr.,p.47, Ls.i3-16.) The officers then handcuffed Mr. Tena and had 
another officer, Deputy Merrill, transport him to jail. (R., p.i08; Tr., p.55, Ls.12-20.) As 
he was being taken from the house, Mr. Tena yelled (in English) to not let the officers 
into the house or his bedroom. (Tr., p.55, L.17 - p.56, L.3, p.58, Ls.2-i1.) 
After Mr. Tena was taken from the house, Deputy Bernad and Deputy Garrett 
spoke with Ms. Tena at the front door of the residence. (R., p.i08; Tr., p.29, L.25 -
p.30, L.7.) In its order denying Mr. Tena's motion to suppress, the district court found 
that "Deputy Bernad asked Ms. Tena questions in English and she responded in 
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English," and that other times Deputy "provided Spanish interpretation for 
Bemad and Ms. "(R., p.108.) Deputy Garrett asked Ms. Tena if the 
officers could search the residence, and she said yes. (R., p.i 08.) The district court 
also found that Deputy Garrett asked Ms. Tena "if she had access to the house," and 
she replied that she did. (R., p.i ) 
Deputy Garrett translated part of a consent to search form for Ms. Tena, and 
explained that it would allow the officers to search the residence, including Mr. Tena's 
bedroom. (R., pp.108-09.) Ms. Tena then signed the consent form. (R., p.109.) The 
district court found that "Deputy Bernad did not observe any behavior on the part of 
Ms. Tena that made him think she was afraid or 
were saying to her." (R., p.i09.) Ms. 
not understand what the officers 
took the officers downstairs to 
Mr. Tena's bedroom, "without hesitating or asking any questions." (R., p.i09.) The 
district court found that she told them that Mr. Tena "was lazy and that he hardly ever 
left his bedroom," and that she indicated that "she did his laundry and took meals to him 
in his bedroom." (R., p.i09.) Deputy Bernad saw that the bedroom door was halfway 
open and that it had an old skeleton key lock. (R., p.i 09.) 
The officers then searched Mr. Tena's bedroom. (R., p.i09.) In the bedroom, 
Deputy Bernad found, in plain view, a baggie containing a white crystal substance. 
(R, p.24.) The white crystal substance later tested presumptively positive for 
amphetamines. (R, p.25.) The officer also found a pipe with a burnt brown residue 
inside, and a coin purse containing a glass pipe and five small baggies. (R, pp.24-25.) 
Mr. Tena was charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance, 
felony, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), and one count of possession of drug 
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paraphernalia with the intent to use, in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A. 
(R.,pp.21 41 .) He initially a not guilty to the (R., pp.26, 
) The State later amended the charges to add a persistent violator sentencing 
enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514, on account of Mr. Tena's 2002 convictions for 
possession of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to deliver. (R., pp.74-75.) 
Mr. Tena subsequently filed a motion to suppress. (See R., p.77.) After 
conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court allowed the parties to brief the 
issues. (Tr., p.5, Ls.7-11, p.62, Ls.6-25). The district court then denied Mr. Tena's 
motion to suppress. (R., pp.107-13.) The district court determined that "regardless of 
whether Ms. Tena had actual authority to consent to Ule search [Mr. Tena's] 
bedroom, she had apparent authority to do so." (R., p.111.) Based on the underlying 
circumstances, "the officers reasonably believed that Ms. Tena had ready access and 
common control over [Mr. Tena's] bedroom as part of her residence, and that she could 
consent to a search." (R., p.112.) Thus, the district court determined that Ms. Tena had 
apparent authority to consent to the search, because the officers' belief that she had 
authority to consent "was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances." 
(R., p.112.) 
Later, Mr. Tena entered into a conditional plea agreement with the State, and 
agreed to plead guilty to the possession of a controlled substance charge. (R., pp.127-
28, 138-40.) The State would dismiss the possession of drug paraphernalia with the 
intent to use charge. (R., p.139.) Mr. Tena reserved his right to appeal the district 
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court's denial of 
ilty plea. (R., p.i 
motion to (R., p.i31.) district court 
At sentencing, the parties stipulated to a unified sentence of seven years, with 
one year fixed. (R., p.158.) The district court imposed the stipulated sentence. 
(R., pp.158~61.) 
Mr. Tena then filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.165~66.) The Idaho Court 
of Appeals affirmed the district court's order denying Mr. Tena's motion to suppress. 
(Opinion, pp.1, 10.) The Court held that the officers "acted under the lawful consent of 
Tena's mother when searching his room." (Opinion, p.10.) Relying on the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Fernandez v. California, U.S. 134 
S. Ct. 1126 (2014), the Court essentially decided that Ms. had apparent authority 
to consent to the search because of the "circumstances of the joint access" to the 
bedroom and because Mr. Tena "was not present and actively objecting." (See 
Opinion, pp.5-10.) 
Mr. Tena filed a timely Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals' Opinion. 
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ISSUE 
Is the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming district court's denial of Mr. Tena's 
motion to suppress in conflict with previous decisions of the Idaho Court Of Appeals, 
such that the Idaho Supreme Court should grant review? 
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ARGUMENT 
The Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion Affirming The District Court's Denial Of Mr. Tena's 
Motion To Suppress Is In Conflict With Previous Decisions Of The Idaho Court 
Of Appeals And, Therefore, Review Should Be Granted 
A. Introduction 
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that the decision of whether to grant a petition 
for review is discretionary on the part of the Idaho Supreme Court, and that petitions for 
review may be granted only "when there are special and important reasons" for doing 
so. I.A.R. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered. Rule 118(b) 
a non-exhaustive list of five factors which must be considered in evaluating 
any petition for review: 
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance 
not yet decided by the Idaho Supreme Court; 
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with 
precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States 
Supreme Court; 
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own 
prior decisions; 
(4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for 
the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority; and, 
(5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further 
appellate review is desirable. 
I.A.R. 118(b). In this case, Mr. Tena contends that there are special and important 
reasons for review to be granted. Specifically, the Opinion is inconsistent with previous 
decisions of the Court of Appeals. See I.A.R. 118(b)(3). 
Here, the Court of Appeals essentially concluded that Ms. Tena gave "lawful 
consent" to the search of Mr. Tena's bedroom because she had apparent authority to 
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consent to the search. Opinion, pp.5-10.) But under State v. Benson, 1 Idaho 
1 (Ct. App. 1999), Ms. Tena did not have apparent authority to consent to the 
of Mr. Tena's bedroom. The officers' reliance on her apparent authority, under the 
totality of the circumstances presented, was objectively unreasonable. Thus, the 
Opinion is in conflict with previous decisions of the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
"In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the 
Court defers to the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous; 
however, the Court freely the determination as to whether constitutional 
requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found." 
Idaho 342, 345 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
v. Hansen, 1 
"Individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy within their homes which is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment." State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 221 (1999). The 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. 
IV., Idaho Const. art., I, § 17. "A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable." 
Hansen, 151 Idaho at 346. However, H[c]onsent voluntarily given by someone with 
authority is an exception to the warrant requirement." Id. The person giving consent 
"must have either actual authority to consent or authority that is reasonably apparent." 
Id. "The burden is on the State to show that the consent exception applies." Id. 
Actual authority to consent to a home search depends on the consenting person 
sharing "common authority" with the defendant over the premises searched, which rests 
upon the 
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mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or 
control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of 
the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right 
and that others have assumed the risk that one of their number might 
permit the common area to be searched. 
Hansen, 151 Idaho at 346 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 
(1974)); State v, Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466,473 (Ct. App. 2008). 
If the person giving consent does not have actual authority to consent to a 
search, a warrantless consent search may be upheld only if "the police officer 
reasonably believes that the person giving consent has the authority to do so." Hansen, 
151 Idaho at 346. "Police have a duty of reasonable investigation before they may rely 
upon the authority of a third party to consent to a search." Brauch, 133 Idaho at 1. 
As with factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, 
determination of consent to enter must be judged against an objective 
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment ... 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party 
had authority over the premises? If not, then warrantless entry without 
further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists. But if so, the 
search is valid. 
Id. (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990)). Thus, "the analysis 
related to a determination of whether a third party had apparent authority to consent to a 
search of premises is limited to what officers knew prior to a search of such premises." 
State v. Robinson, 152 Idaho 961,966 (Ct. App. 2012). 
C. Ms. Tena Did Not Have Apparent Authority To Consent To The Search, Because 
The Officers' Reliance On Her Apparent Authority, Under The Totality Of The 
Circumstances Presented, Was Objectively Unreasonable 
Mr. Tena asserts that Ms. Tena did not have apparent authority to consent to the 
search of Mr. Tena's bedroom under Benson, 133 Idaho 152. The officers' reliance on 
Ms. Tena's apparent authority, under the totality of the circumstances presented, was 
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objectively unreasonable. Thus, the Opinion is in conflict with previous decisions of the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. 
As discussed above, a warrantless consent search may be upheld on the basis 
of apparent authority only if "the police officer reasonably believes that the person giving 
consent has the authority to do so." Hansen, 151 Idaho at 346. In Benson, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals outlined the following factors in the "reasonableness calculus" for 
assessing the reasonableness of an officer's reliance on a party's apparent authority 
to consent: 
First, the third party may not generally have "joint access ... for most 
purposes"; his right of access may narrowly prescribed. Second, the 
objector may not be an "absent ... person"; he may at the time 
third party consent is obtained. Finally, the objector not simply be 
"nonconsenting"; he may actively oppose the search. 
Benson, 133 Idaho at 158 (quoting United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1233 (9th 
Cir. 1984)). 
1. Benson And The Reasonableness Calculus For Apparent Authority 
In Benson, detectives sought to search a detached garage where a mother's 
adult daughter and the daughter's boyfriend lived. Benson, 133 Idaho at 153-54. After 
the daughter and boyfriend requested that the officers leave the premises, the 
detectives arrested the boyfriend for possession of marijuana. Id. at 154. The daughter 
continued to protest, and the detectives separated the mother and daughter before 
obtaining the mother's consent to search the garage. Id. On appeal from the denial of 
the boyfriend's motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the mother's 
consent to search, the Court of Appeals held that the mother did not have apparent 
authority to give valid consent to the search of the garage. Id. at 154, 160. 
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Regarding the mother's right of joint access to the premises searched, the 
Benson Court noted that, the time obtained to search the 
garage from the mother, the mother had answered in the affirmative when asked if the 
garage belonged to her, if she had access to it, and if she stored "stuff" inside it. Id. at 
158. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals held that, under the totality of the 
circumstances known to the detectives at the time the mother consented to the search, 
the detectives "lacked an objectively reasonable basis to believe that [the mother] had 
joint access to and mutual use of the garage without some further inquiry," Id. This was 
because the detectives also knew that the daughter and boyfriend lived in the garage, 
and they had "demanded that the detectives 
objected to the detectives' and entry into 
the property and then strenuously 
garage." lei. 
The presence of nonconsenting parties factor also indicated that the mother did 
not have apparent authority. The Court of Appeals observed that, while the mother 
cooperated with the detectives, the daughter and boyfriend requested that the officers 
leave the property. Id. at 158-59. Specifically, the daughter told the detectives "to 
remove themselves from her property," and when the boyfriend "exited the garage and 
was told of the detectives' investigation, he also protested their presence and told them 
to leave the premises." Id. at 159. "At each step of the detectives' investigation they 
were implicitly, if not explicitly, aware that [the daughter and boyfriend] claimed an 
interest in the garage superior to [the mother's] and did not want the detectives to 
enter." Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that, "At a minimum, these factors should 
have cast doubt upon [the mother's] ability to give valid consent and put the detectives 
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on notice that further inquiry into the parties' relationship to the was 
necessary." Id. (emphasis in original). 
With regard to active objections to the detectives' entry and search, the third 
factor in the reasonableness calculus, the Benson Court stated that "[t]he fact that [the 
daughter and boyfriend] actively voiced their objections to the detectives, rather than 
simply acquiescing to their presence and entry by mere nonconsent, i.e., silence, is 
significant." Id. The Court held that the detectives' reliance on the mother's apparent 
authority, "under the totality of the circumstances presented," was objectively 
unreasonable. Id. at 159-60. 
2. 
Apparent Authority To Consent To The Search Of Mr. Tena's Bedroom 
Was Objectively Unreasonable 
Similarly, the Benson factors show that the officers' reliance on Ms. Tena's 
apparent authority to consent to the search of Mr. Tena's bedroom was 
objectively unreasonable. Thus, the Opinion is in conflict with previous decisions of the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. 
a. Ms. Tena's Right Of Joint Access To The Premises Searched 
With respect to the first factor in the Benson reasonableness calculus, Ms. Tena 
did not have joint access for most purposes. Rather, her right of access to Mr. Tena's 
bedroom was narrowly prescribed. 
The Court of Appeals determined that "the first [Benson] factor does not support 
requiring a further inquiry," because "the circumstances of the joint access are markedly 
different [from Benson]." (Opinion, p.5.) While "the mother in Benson merely accessed 
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the garage for the limited purpose of T ena "told officers she had access to 
[Mr. Tena's] room to bring meals, do laundry, and clean the room." (Opinion, p.5.) 
Further, "the mother in Benson consented to the search of a detached garage; whereas 
here, the mother gave officers consent to search a room within the mother's own home." 
(Opinion, p.5.) 
However, Ms. Tena's limited purposes for accessing Mr. Tena's bedroom and the 
location of the bedroom in Ms. Tena's residence do not indicate that she had joint 
access for most purposes. The facts pertaining to Ms. Tena's joint access in this case 
are similar to the facts pertaining to the mother's joint access in Benson. As in Benson, 
the officers here "lacked an objectively basis to believe that [Ms. Tena] had 
joint access to and mutual use of the [bedroom] without some further inquiry." See 
Benson, 133 Idaho at 158. 
Based on the officers' questioning about Ms. Tena's access to Mr. Tena's 
bedroom, they knew that she had access to the bedroom only for the two limited 
purposes of doing Mr. Tena's laundry and bringing meals to him.1 (See R., pp.108-09, 
Tr., p.33, Ls.5-14.) Just as "[a] landlord does not have apparent authority merely 
because the landlord has legitimate access to the premises for limited purposes," 
Brauch, 133 Idaho at 221, Ms. Tena did not have joint access to the bedroom for most 
purposes merely because she had access to the bedroom for those two 
limited purposes. 
1 Despite the Court of Appeals stating that Ms. Tena also had access to "clean the 
room" (see Opinion, p.5), the district court did not expressly find that she had access to 
clean Mr. Tena's bedroom beyond doing laundry. (See R., pp.109, 112.) 
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In light of Ms. Tena's "narrowly prescribed" access to the bedroom, the location 
the searched in this case does not indicate that she had joint access. 
Benson, 133 Idaho at 158. Even though the bedroom was in her residence, because 
Ms. Tena's right of access was only for the limited purposes of doing Mr. Tena's laundry 
and bringing to him, it cannot be said that Ms. Tena had joint access to the 
bedroom for most purposes. 
Mr. Tena's age also indicates that Ms. Tena, rather than having joint access to 
the bedroom for most purposes, only had a narrowly prescribed right of access to the 
room. As Court of Appeals noted (see Opinion, p.i), Mr. Tena was thirty-one 
old the of the search. (See Tr., p. Ls.1 8, p.28, Ls.8-10.) Mr. Tena's 
age means that Tena's right to access to the bedroom was fundamentally different 
than if Mr. had been a minor child or even an adult child in his teens. See Hillary 
B. Farber, A Parent's "Apparenf' Authority: Why Intergenerational Coresidence 
Requires a Reassessment of Parental Consent to Search Adult Children's Bedrooms, 
21 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 39, 58 (2011) ("None of the rationales, which permit a 
parent's consent to trump a child's expectation of privacy, are legally applicable once 
the child becomes an adult."); see also State v. Ham, 113 Idaho 405 (Ct. App. 1987) 
(holding that the defendant's mother had sufficient "common control" to consent to the 
search of the defendant's bedroom, where the nineteen-year-old defendant paid rent for 
the bedroom but shared the bedroom with his minor child sibling, and the mother 
accessed the bedroom to pick up dishes and laundry). 
In sum, Ms. Tena did not have joint access to Mr. Tena's bedroom for most 
purposes. The officers "lacked an objectively reasonable basis to believe that 
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[Ms. TenaJ had joint access to and mutual use of the [bedroom] without some further 
inquiry." 1 Idaho at 158. 
b. The Presence Of Nonconsenting Parties And Mr. Tena's Active 
Objections To The Officers' Entry And Search 
With respect to the other two factors in the Benson reasonableness calculus, 
Mr. Tena was present as a nonconsenting party to the search, and he actively objected 
to the officers' entry into the residence. 
However, the Court of Appeals determined that Mr. T ena "was not present and 
actively objecting." (Opinion, p.5.) In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals 
relied on the United Supreme Court's recent decision in Fernandez v. California, 
U.S. 1 Ct. 1126 (2014). (See Opinion, pp.5~9.) After discussing 
Fernandez, the Court of Appeals determined that, "Based on Tena's location off the 
premises and the circumstances of his removal, it is clear that officers obtained consent 
when Tena was no longer present." (Opinion, p.9.) According to the Court of Appeals, 
"Once they lawfully removed Tena from the premises, the officers were free to talk with 
and rely on his mother's consent to search her house." (Opinion, p.9.) 
However, Fernandez does not apply to the Benson reasonableness calculus for 
apparent authority, because the Fernandez Court did not address whether it was 
reasonable for officers to rely on a party's apparent authority to consent to a search. 
Rather, the only issue on appeal in Fernandez was "whether [Georgia v. Randolph, 547 
U.S. 103 (2006)] applies if the objecting occupant is absent when another occupant 
consents." Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1129-30. In Rando/ph, the United States Supreme 
Court held that "a physically present inhabitant's express refusal of consent to a police 
search [of his home] is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow 
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occupant." Rando/ph, 547 U.S. 1 The Fernandez Court described Rando/ph 
as narrow exception" to rule that by one resident of jointly occupied 
premises is generally sufficient to justify a warrantless search." Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. 
at 1133. The Court ultimately held that Rando/ph does not apply if the objecting 
occupant is absent when another occupant consents. /d. at 1129-30, 1134-37. 
Fernandez did not address whether it was reasonable for officers to rely on a 
party's apparent authority to consent to a search. The defendant in Fernandez did not 
challenge the consenting occupant's actual authority to consent to a search. See 
Fernandez, 134 Ct. 1138 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[P]etitioner does not contest 
that [the consenting occupant] had common authority over the premises."); see a/so 
United v. Peyton, 745 546, 556 (D.C. Cir. 14) ("Our case concerns the 
scope of a cotenant's common authority, an issue not addressed in Fernandez for a 
simple reason: [the defendant] never disputed that [the consenting occupant] had the 
necessary common authority.") Additionally, the Fernandez Court used "the terms 
'occupant,' 'resident,' and 'tenant' interchangeably to refer to persons having 'common 
authority' over premises within the meaning of Matlock," I.e., actual authority. See 
Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1129 n.1. 
By relying on Fernandez to determine whether it was reasonable for the officers 
to rely upon Ms. Tena's apparent authority to consent to a search of Mr. Tena's 
bedroom, the Court of Appeals' Opinion is in conflict with Benson. Because Fernandez 
did not address whether it was reasonable for officers to rely on a party's apparent 
authority to consent to a search, it does not undermine or otherwise affect the Benson 
reasonableness calculus for assessing apparent authority. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 
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("Fernandez thus says nothing that undermines our analysis of [the consenting 
party's] authority."). 
Further, it would make no sense to extend Fernandez to the Benson 
reasonableness calculus, because the concems underlying the Fernandez decision are 
not at play when assessing apparent authority. As discussed by the Court of Appeals 
(Opinion, p.7), the Fernandez Court rejected the defendant's argument that his 
objection made at the premises remained effective until he withdrew it, because that 
argument "cannot be squared with the 'widely shared social expectations' or 'customary 
social usage' upon which the Randolph holding was " Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 
11 (quoting Rando/ph, 547 U.S. 111,121). facing a present objecting 
occupant, a friend or visitor invited to enter shared by another occupant would 
not enter, or expect "an uncomfortable scene" or worse if they tried to enter. Id. at 
1135; Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113. But if the objecting occupant were not at the 
premises, the friend or visitor would be more likely to accept the invitation to enter. 
Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1135. 
The Fernandez Court's concern about "widely shared social expectations" or 
"customary social usage" is not at play when assessing apparent authority. The Court, 
by using the term "occupant," presupposed that the "objecting occupant" and "another 
occupant" would both have actual authority to consent to search or otherwise invite 
people to enter shared premises. See id. at 1129 n.1 & 1135. Thus, this customary 
social usage does not factor into assessing the reasonableness of an officer's reliance 
on a party's apparent authority to consent. 
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Fernandez additionally stated that allowing for the defendant's objection to 
remain effective in his absence produce a plethora of practical 
id. at 1135. As the Court of Appeals observed, the Fernandez Court "was concemed 
with the difficulty of determining the proper duration of a continuing objection, the 
existence of common authority over the premises after the passage of time, the 
procedure necessary to invoke the continued objection, and who would be bound by the 
objection." (Opinion, p.? (citing Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1135-36).) 
The Court's concern about "practical problems" is also not at play when 
assessing apparent authority. The issues about whether what extent an 
objection would remain effective in the future are not present when assessing 
authority, because "the analysis related to a determination of whether a third party had 
apparent authority to consent to a search of premises is limited to what officers knew 
prior to a search of such premises." See Robinson, 152 Idaho at 966 
(emphasis added). Because the concerns underlying the Fernandez decision are not at 
play when assessing apparent authority, it would make no sense to extend Fernandez 
to the Benson reasonableness calculus. 
The presence of nonconsenting parties and active objection factors from the 
Benson reasonableness calculus both indicate that Ms. Tena did not have apparent 
authority to consent to the search. As with the facts pertaining to Ms. Tena's joint 
access, the facts pertaining to these two factors are similar to the facts pertaining to the 
two factors in Benson. 
For purposes of the Benson reasonableness calculus, Mr. Tena was present as a 
non consenting party to the search. The reasonableness of the officers' reliance on 
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apparent authority of the party consenting a search is on "the totality of the 
circumstances presented." Benson, 1 Idaho 160. The objecting party's 
presence prior to the time the officers obtained consent is part of the totality of the 
circumstances for assessing whether the consenting party had apparent authority. See 
Benson, 133 Idaho at 158-60; cf Fernandez, U.S. at 134 S. Ct. at 1129-30 & 
n.1 (holding that an absent occupant's prior objection does not override the consent of 
another occupant with common authority over the premises searched). 
For example, in Benson the Court of Appeals noted that the daughter and 
boyfriend objected before the officers obtained consent to search from the mother, and 
"[alt each step of the detectives' investigation they were implicitly, if not explicitly, aware 
that [the daughter and boyfriend] claimed an interest in the garage superior to [the 
mother's] and did not want the detectives to enter." Benson, 1 Idaho at 158-59 
(emphasis added). Further, the Benson Court considered the boyfriend's objection to 
the search, even though the boyfriend had been arrested for possession of marijuana 
before the officers obtained the mother's consent to search. See id. at 155, 158-59. 
Prior to obtaining consent to search in this case, the officers knew that Mr. Tena 
had argued with Ms. Tena after she went to get him, and that Mr. Tena yelled to not let 
the officers search the house. (Tr., pA7, Ls.9-13, p.55, Ls.17-20, p.58, Ls.2-11.) Thus, 
the officers, "[a]t each step of [their] investigation," were "aware that [Mr. Tena] claimed 
an interest in the [bedroom] superior to [Ms. Tena's], and did not want the [officers] to 
enter." See Benson, 133 Idaho at 159. Even though Mr. Tena had been arrested and 
taken to a patrol car outside the residence at the time the officers obtained Ms. Tena's 
consent to search (Opinion, pp.1-2), under Benson the Court should have considered 
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Mr. Tena's presence prior to the time the officers obtained consent. Mr. Tena was 
present as a nonconsenting party to the search. 
Mr. Tena also actively objected to the officers' entry and search of his bedroom. 
Mr. Tena did not simply acquiesce to the search through his silence, but yelled to not let 
the officers into the house. (Tr., p.55, Ls.17-20, p.58, Ls.2-11.) Further, although there 
was no testimony as to the exact subject of the argument (see Tr., p.47, Ls.9-23), 
Mr. Tena's argument with Ms. Tena may indicate that he was actively objecting to 
the search. 
on the Benson factors, the officers' reliance on Ms. Tena's apparent 
was objectively unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances 
presented in this case. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' statements distinguishing the 
two cases, the facts and circumstances here are similar to those in Benson. Like the 
detectives in Benson, 133 Idaho at 159-60, the officers here knew that Mr. Tena 
(because he yelled not to let the officers into the residence) would not consent to the 
search (R., pp.108-09; Tr., p.55, Ls.17-20, p.58, Ls.2-11). Like the detectives in 
Benson, 133 Idaho at 159, the officers here knew that Ms. Tena had limited access to 
the bedroom and that Mr. Tena had objected to their entry into the residence (see 
R., pp.108-09; Tr., p.33, Ls.5-14, p.55, Ls.17-20, p.58, Ls.2-11). And like the detectives 
in Benson, 133 Idaho at 160, the officers here "never sought to establish [Mr. Tena's] 
interest in the [bedroom], ignored [his] protests, and merely queried [Ms. Tena] very 
cursorily and superficially as to her interest in the property." (See R., p.108; Tr., p.33, 
Ls.5-14.) 
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Thus, under totality of the circumstances in this case, officers' 
on Ms. apparent authority was objectively unreasonable. Benson, 
1 Idaho at 160. Under Benson, Ms. Tena did not have apparent authority to consent 
to the search of Mr. Tena's bedroom.2 The Opinion is therefore in conflict with previous 
decisions of the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Tena respectfully requests that this Court grant 
review. On review, Mr. Tena respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district 
court's denial his motion to suppress remand his case to the district court for 
further 
DATED this day of May, 2014. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
2 The district court held that Ms. Tena had apparent authority to consent to the search of 
Mr. Tena's bedroom (Opinion, p.2), and the Court of Appeals essentially held that 
Ms. Tena had apparent authority. (See Opinion, pp.5-10.) To the extent that this Court 
is concerned about whether Ms. Tena, even if she did not have apparent authority, had 
actual authority to consent to the search, Mr. Tena asserts that Ms. Tena did not have 
actual authority. His arguments on this issue were previously articulated in the 
Appellant's Brief. (See App. Br., pp.14-19.) They need not be repeated in this 
Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, but are incorporated herein by 
reference thereto. 
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